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On collective unintelligence  
Mark McGovern 
School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology 
Abstract. The idea of collective unintelligence is examined in this paper to 
highlight some of the conceptual and practical problems faced in modeling 
groups.  Examples drawn from international crises and economics provide 
illustrative problems of collective failures to act in intelligent ways, despite the 
inputs and efforts of many skilled and intelligent parties.  Choices made of 
“appropriate” perceptions, analysis and evaluations are examined along with 
how these might be combined.  A simple vector representation illustrates some 
of the issues and creative possibilities in multi-party actions.  Revealed as 
manifest (un-)intelligence are the resolutions of various problems and potentials 
that arise in dealing with the “each and all” of a group (wherein items are 
necessarily non-parallel and of unequal valency).  Such issues challenge those 
seeking to model collective intelligence, but much may be learned.        
Keywords: intelligence, paradoxes, crisis, resolution, international economics  
1 Introduction 
Collective unintelligence is examined in this paper through considerations of 
illustrative problems and approaches from economics.  The goals are to foster 
discussion of issues that appear to be important when intelligence is to be applied and 
to explore approaches with some apparent potential.  The underlying position is that 
effective intelligence involves creative processes and dynamic balances which are 
inhibited by an overreliance upon formal or prescriptive methods.   
Examples of collective unintelligence abound in our world with the ongoing 
global financial and economic crisis probably the most outstanding current example.  
Not only was this “event” unexpected by most, but importantly not all.  Surprisingly 
little coherence is evident in recovery strategies.   Worse still, the actions of many 
nations may well be escalating what has been a banking crisis into crises of national 
default and currency destruction.  Two years into the acute phase of the crisis,  
collective processes have effectively generated a spread and deepening of problems, a 
commitment to risk, a potential for further failures and little real progress. 
“Less unintelligence” in dealing with such problems is needed.  Considerations 
from international economics (along with some from industrial economics and 
international business) are used to outline some core problems.  Reflections offered 
draw from theoretical and applied analyses and well as observations on the 
educational experiences of tertiary students.   Together these help sketch the nature of 
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“failure” in what de Bono [1] termed first stage (or more perceptual) thinking.  
Inappropriate choices (be they of specification, positions, information, influences, 
focii and frames) are all potential sources of errors, failures and “unintelligence”.   
A central conceptual issue is the types of association and selection favoured in any 
multi-party situation.  How this is then treated is particularly critical in second-stage 
(or more analytic) processes.  An illustrative application using vector analysis and 
non-parallel items allows consideration of not just crises but also of the influences 
from prevailing methods.  Intelligence is in part an exercise in avoidance of undue 
dominance.  Brief consideration of the aufheben in Hegel‟s dialectic shows how some 
favoured analytics can strongly flavour perceptions, actions, outputs and outcomes. 
Notionally, applied intelligence is evident when projects and projections “work 
out satisfactorily”.  While satisfaction may be “merely” in terms of survival, typically 
something “more” is sought.  Enhancement of some or other attributes may be a goal 
of an intelligent agent or group.  Changes in quantity and quality style development, 
and these may be variously evaluated, including by various group members.  
Successful collectives dynamically and creatively resolve differences, to the sufficient 
satisfaction of each and all.  “Unintelligent” ones fail in one or more of these aspects. 
Arguably, intelligence as manifest in skilful use of appropriate tools (including 
thoughts and contributory inputs) and effective achievement of desired outcomes is in 
short supply in significant areas of the economy.  Examining “unintelligence issues” 
may help elucidate what needs to be done if collective gains are to be more readily 
achieved and distributed. 
2 Formulating collective unintelligence 
In contrast to collective intelligence which is actively researched as this 
conference and others attest, “collective unintelligence” is little discussed.  Yet all 
manner of maladaptive or otherwise unintelligent behaviours are evident in 
economies and economics.  Attendant crises abound.  History is replete with booms 
followed by busts, of manias and panics, and of fallen mindsets and beliefs.  The 
societal bases of crises and associated “unintelligence” provide a convenient focus. 
People in an interdependent group can worsen situations by trying to do what is 
individually perceived to be “good” or “right”.  Keynes [2] provided an example in 
the paradox of thrift: consumers can be worse off by saving more due to the aggregate 
or collective decrease in generated consumer demand and an associated greater fall in 
incomes as growth and investment ease.  Thus, collective savings fall despite greater 
individual efforts to save. 
Ideas may become debased, with the use of international trade theory providing an 
example.  “All of the things that have been painfully learned through a couple of 
centuries of hard thinking about and careful study of the international economy have 
been swept out of public discourse” by pop internationalism [3].  Such issues are no 
longer historical or intellectual curiosities as crisis-hit nations search for better 
collective outcomes and some “desperately needed” solutions.  
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Analytic discussions are often couched in formal terms (and may address narrow 
or technical aspects or such things as logical fallacies of composition).  It is striking 
how poorly such treatments travel beyond the immediate analysis and literature, or in 
the minds of students.  Central points often seem to be lost in a fog of confusion and 
detail.  “Why?” questions that can be suggested include: 
─ why a critical or crisis situation can or does occur in a collective setting? 
─ why the body of relevant analysis does not disseminate more fully? and 
─ why students and intelligent others struggle with explanations offered? 
Relaying particular or common understandings involves projecting insights into event 
occurrences via information dissemination, idea comprehension and other steps.  
Evaluation of any such understanding  may include considerations of such things as:  
─ the sensitivity to definitions adopted;  
─ the problems of resolving many intelligences or positions; and  
─ the issues of relevant emphasis.   
Such “how” issues while often noted are typically then worked around by assumption. 
 
Exploring these three “how” issues further shows some possibilities and problems. 
1. definitions.  Pfeifer and Scheier [4], for example, who comment that intelligence is 
“hard to define” and that “not much agreement has been achieved” (p 6) find a 
“common denominator” in adaptive behaviour which has ”two components: 
complying with existing rules and generating new behavior” (pp 20-21).  Other 
definitionals could be used, such as preserving some properties other than rules.  
However, unchanging behavior may be adaptive, including over some horizons but 
not others, and may involve explicit and appropriate choices.   These comments are 
not meant to criticise good work but rather to point out the special and sometimes 
still-ambiguous nature of any definitional basis.  Further, when or how might 
definitionally intelligent behavior be situationally unintelligent?  What accords 
with definitions need not accord with some wider reality. 
2. one or many intelligences, and, if the latter, how these should be reconciled.  Such 
multiplicity can occur within one party or between many.   
a. The multiple intelligences of the single human [5] have been 
variously expressed1 but achieving effective balances appears 
under-considered.   How might suitable balances be “objectively” or 
impersonally achieved, or are they inherently personalised? 
                                                          
1 As expressed by 6. Armstrong, T. Multiple intelligences.  2000  [cited; Available 
from: http://www.thomasarmstrong.com/multiple_intelligences.htm. the eight intelligences 
are: Linguistic intelligence ("word smart");  Logical-mathematical intelligence 
("number/reasoning smart");  Spatial intelligence ("picture smart"); Bodily-Kinesthetic 
intelligence ("body smart"); Musical intelligence ("music smart");  Interpersonal intelligence 
("people smart"); Intrapersonal intelligence ("self smart"); and Naturalist intelligence 
("nature smart"). 
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b. In any group of “intelligent” parties there will be a multitude of 
“intelligences” and any expectations of a single collective 
preference are bold, situationally and analytically.   Cournot [7] was 
among the first to mathematically explore situations of economic 
interdependence wherein the outcomes for one (and for all) depend 
sensitively and in part on the actions of some other.  His work and 
much of game theory demonstrate well many problems “of 
interdependence” which remain essentially unresolved today. 
c. Ricardo [8] preferred the bold position, arguing for mutual gains 
from trade via comparative advantage for any nations.  For some, 
intelligence became belief in a rule with the “can gain” of 
possibility became a dogmatic “must”, particularly under Empire.  
The limitations and setting of Ricardo‟s work remain often ignored. 
d. Olson [9] considered how tight minorities could drive collective 
positions, even if the majority was to be disadvantaged.   
3. approach choice, focus and relevance.  Arguments abound about excessive 
attention to some preferred aspect(s) or intelligence(s) of an individual or group.   
a. The recent popularization of the “emotional intelligence” argument 
[10] enlivened the debate but gains made remain uncertain.    
Interestingly “rationality” is the preferred touchstone in economics.   
b. De Bono [11] sees potential in creative sequencing of different 
“hats”2 which help direct focus and attention in thinking to achieve 
a more effective and constructive application of intelligences. 
c. In terms of thinking about information (within the white hat, say) de 
Bono [12] proposes six complementary frames3.  We may ponder 
potential insights from framing under the other coloured hats. 
Related is the question of whether terms of intelligent or unintelligent add anything of 
value, and indeed what do the terms mean?  “Intelligence” remains a highly contested 
term and its exercise involves some fluidity in action and interpretation.   
“Unintelligence” could arise from adverse influences in any of these areas.  Note 
all these aspects are prior to any detailed analysis. “Something somewhere in how 
things were approached does or did not work out” would be a forensic expectation 
when approaching an incident scene of potential or realized collective unintelligence.   
 
                                                          
2 The six hats (with focus) are: white (information); red (feelings, emotions and intuition); 
black (faults, weaknesses, risks); yellow (values, benefits and how to achieve); green 
(creative effort); and blue (organization of thinking).   Arguably much discussion is white 
then black, a presentation of information with highlighting of weaknesses: in an informal 
experiment, advanced undergraduate students studying tourism were markedly reluctant to 
engage in hat thinking beyond the white and black. Some found the whole process most 
confronting. 
3 The six areas of attention (and frame) are: purpose (triangle); accuracy (circle); point of view 
(square); interest (heart); value (diamond); and outcome (slab). 
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A particular approach is now built from a working definition of “intelligence” as 
“an ability to project successfully”.  While there may be an interpretative bias 
towards a focus on“ability”, unintelligence might involve some inability, failure(s) in 
and/or of projection and/or lack of success.  To explore this working basis, chosen 
situations and specifications will be both analysed and suggestively constructed.  
 
This definition of intelligence can be expounded in various ways, for example as:  
an ability of ___ to project ___ some item  successfully ___ on some grounds  
Success is now set here in terms of goals with evaluation to be somehow by 
comparison with them.  Such a phrase can be populated in a variety of ways.  
Illustrative examples could include an ability of  
─ an organism to project past a danger so as to survive or build a relationship  
─ a group of workers to project their efforts so as to produce and prosper 
─ a baby collecting toys in a basket so as to carry more of „mine‟  
Each of these could be deemed “economic” as they involve resource use.  They could 
be alternately deemed as psychological (mind involving), physiological (involving 
use of a physical body), aspirational (as they may evidence purpose) and so on.   
Each could be debated in terms of the nature or type of intelligence evident, and as 
to why any instance or example qualifies as an exemplar of intelligence at all.  Does 
the organism, worker or baby have to be human, or organic – and if not, why?   Such 
debates while important are beyond the scope of this paper.  The approach here is to 
draw a little from centuries of economic investigations whereby “collective 
intelligence” was built so as to advance the interests of all and, variously, each.  It 
was after all “the Wealth of Nations” that drew the attention of Adam Smith [13] and 
of many since.  Much was learnt from failures, and to these we now turn. 
3 Just “stuff ups” or collective (economic) unintelligence? 
Economic crises of various types occur reasonably regularly in nations and 
regions around the world.  Marhjnsen [14, p 533] lists fifteen developing nations 
associated with the 1980‟s debt crisis.  The US financial system with its Savings and 
Loans crisis was also restructured to accommodate unrepayable debts.   As Feenstra 
and Taylor  [15] detail, 1992 saw six European currencies depreciate up to 25 percent.  
The 1997 Asian exchange rate crises impacted eight nations heavily (peak falls in the 
baht and rupiah were 50 and 80 percent) with subsequent pursuit of  strong external 
surplus positions (mirrored by high deficit positions in several developed nations such 
as the USA and Australia).    Other notable currency crises  include the Brazilian real 
(-40% in 1998), Russian ruble (-80% in 1999) and Argentine peso (-80% in 2002).  
De Paoili, Hoggarth et al. [16] list 45 crises between 1970 and 2000 involving default, 
of which those also involving exchange rate and banking crises numbered 21 with an 
average length of 10 years and a mean cost per year of 22 percent of GDP.  Collective 
failures in economies are neither rare nor trivial. 
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“Every crisis is different, of course. Ukraine faced hyperinflation in 1994; Russia 
desperately needed help when its short-term-debt rollover scheme exploded in the 
summer of 1998; the Indonesian rupiah plunged in 1997, nearly levelling the 
corporate economy; that same year, South Korea’s 30-year economic miracle ground 
to a halt when foreign banks suddenly refused to extend new credit.  But I must tell 
you, to IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar.” [17] 
At base in a crisis is some unexpected event which sees expectations out of kilter 
with new realities. Johnson [17] sees the economic solution as “seldom very hard to 
work out” and focuses on the political and institutional issues which brought about the 
crisis and may stand in the path of an IMF style solution, a “solution” much debated.  
Actual transitions from crisis, such as those of the post-Soviet nations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, demonstrate both variously successful resolutions of crisis and that it 
is often difficult to effect “a solution”.  Success is not assured, nor a path determined. 
Several distinct types of crisis that can be variously interlinked are recognised in 
international economics.  A convenient reference is the development [15, 16] which 
combines bank, exchange rate, default and industry crises in an interlinked group, as 
reproduced below.    
 
 
Fig. 1. Vicious Circles in Twin and Triple Crises  [15 Fig 22-23]  
Single or successively building twin and triple crises are taken as impacting on 
real output (centred on product production and consumption), with further feedbacks 
possible from the real economy to the finance, monetary and government sectors. 
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The elements in the schema are these: 
─ Banks and a financial system, termed Finance, F say 
─ A set of currencies variously exchangeable, Monies M 
─ Governments, G, with their policies and influences “for the collective good” 
─ Product producers and consumers, as industries I 
The whole, which might be termed “FIGM”, is a figment of their “informed” 
imaginations.  FIGM relays a pattern4.  It is an indeterminate complex of four distinct 
elements variously interrelating.5    However, not only are these elements interlinked.  
Each element is itself complex having some internal structure and arrangements that 
condition conduct and may (or may not) allow for internal resolutions of problems.  
Any exercises in unintelligence that may lead to crisis can then be seen as potentially 
internal to some element, linked externally in some way to another somehow-like 
element, and/or interlinked generally with several or all other elements.   
Facing the question “How is sense to be made of such confusion - or richness of 
possibilities?” we make assumptions, including of significant associations and of 
some sequencing via time or cumulative effect.  That is, we build a model.  A cadence 
of interactions or flows is imposed across the complex to produce some applicable 
order.6  We then assume that a preferred cadence is relevant and somehow 
meaningful, or at least sometimes (or at some time) plausible.7  Much debate centres 
on the superiority of this cadence or that, both technically and as deemed relevant.     
It may surprise but the idea of “crisis” is little considered in “International 
Economics” texts.8  It was interesting recently to find how effective introducing 
“crisis” at the beginning of semester and paralleling it with standard expositions of 
theory appeared to be in developing student understanding.  This mirrors educational 
experiences in international business and industry analysis where reflections on the 
tensions between alternate perceptions aided learning.  Each of these three areas has a 
distinctive yet complementary focus and position.  Together they can provide richer 
insights into international and national business situations.  Speculatively then, what 
complementary insights might advance collective intelligence? 
                                                          
4 Note that while the pattern is based around four elements there are omitted direct 
considerations, such as of balance of payments imbalances. 
5 Note that external (to the focal nation) linkages provided by currency, financing, trade and 
other flows from the rest of the world are not shown.  Alternately, the schema may be taken 
to represent a global situation so the model may be assumed closed externally, but each item 
(node and flow) is then internally heterogeneous in marked and significant ways. 
6 This is essentially the line of development of Cournot and others who build from a sequence 
of propositions and inferences to suggest possible configurations and inferred conclusions.  
7 For example, currency crises since 1970 have been classed as four generations, with each 
reflecting a different configuration within Fig 1.   
8  Anecdotally, only one of eight advanced undergraduate texts scanned included explicit 
discussions of “crisis” or “currency crisis”  
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4 A vector example  
Following a short recap of vector basics, triple products are illustratively explored 
to demonstrate various generated outputs.  There appears to be some potential to aid 
understanding of collective situations in economics and intelligence.  The 
development is preliminary and suggestive so comments are very welcome.    
A vector is geometrically a directed line.  It can be specified by a length and 
direction or by a joining of two ordered points.  Metaphorically, a base point can be 
seen as successively projected across space to a destination.  Alternately, a directed 
line is bounded and positioned.  Additional assumptions allow “the line” to be 
“moved across space” if suitable parallels are maintained. 
 
Consider now three vectors f, g and m.   Assume that they cross at some common 
point O.  The vectors can be seen as the distinct projections from some common point 
O of collocated entities F, G, and M.  Two types of vector products can be formed: 
─ scalar (also known as dot or inner, designated by “.”) product.  One vector is 
projected on the other with a scalar (or non directed) output.  A vector property 
disappears and a single, unpositioned number remains. 
─ vector (cross or outer, designated by “x”) product. One vector is combined 
with another with a non-coplanar vector output.  The output is in a different 
dimension.  
With three vectors, compound products are possible.  The scalar triple product is 
of the form f.gxm while the vector is of the form fxgxm .  The former has a single 
numerical or scalar output (equal to the volume of a parallelepiped built on the three 
vectors) while the latter has a vector output (in the plane of the two vectors first 
crossed).  Both products synthesise three “distinct elements” into a single or a set of 
dimensionally different products.   The scalar triple product is illustrated in Figure 2.9  
As an illustrative application, this product can be seen as an indicator of credit 
available at some time Ct  Credit is built on projections adopted by financial, 
governmental and monetary entities.  F, G and M together project C. 
The point in using vectors and their compound products here is that three separate 
entities taken “together” (specifically at the same point O) can produce (via product 
operations) a collective outcome which is infeasible if any one was absent or not “co-
operative”.  Not only does a vector project a point across space, three vectors can 
alternately project the value of a subtended volume and an output vector which is a 
linear combination of the first crossed pair (despite the generative presence of the 
third non-coplanar vector).  In both cases, the output is dimensionally different to the 
basis set.  The scalar triple product lacks any spatial dimension while the vector triple 
product lacks any unique dimensional attributes of the procedurally-third vector.  
These are intriguing outcomes for well-ordered associations of three elements. 
 
                                                          
9 Considerations of the vector triple product are left to another place. 
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Fig. 2. Scalar triple product with product value projected as a parallelepiped volume 
The elements have distinctive contributions and are thus of value and necessary 
presence but they are not equi-valent. This unequal valency10 is lost in the collective 
scalar outcome so some “exogenous” allocation or distribution schema will be 
needed.  In economies this is often couched in custom or culture or concepts such as 
“a fair go”.  The area may be one of societal accord or discord.  
Speculatively, does a triple product qualify as an expression of intelligence?   
─ Both definitional requirements of Pfeifer and Scheier appear met, superficially 
at least, if we accept dimensional change (which is a change in collective quality 
when the set is combined according to the rules) as a behavioural outcome.   
─ The suggested working definition is two-parts met but “successfully” needs 
elucidation.  If, for example, the goals of the vectors or of those cojoining them 
included having a basis for a volume of a certain size, then the scalar triple 
product might indeed be adjudged not only “successful” but “intelligent”. 
Vectors are, of course, assumed to be non-sentient entities yet a case could be built 
that there is or may be intelligence in their triple products.  Alternately, perhaps it is 
not the vectors but the product processes that instills “intelligence”?  Is it Nature (of 
the vectors) or Nurture (via the product environment) or both that yields the outcome 
adjudged as intelligent – or is the whole situation somehow misspecified?  More 
broadly is there an inference of intelligence by the observer or is the product as an 
output of human thought an artefact with intelligence embedded.  If a triple product is 
an invention of imagination, did the imagination embed or uncover intelligence?  
Such questions may lead in many and potentially constructive directions.  
                                                          
10 Literally, “strength” in some situation of combination. This is interpretable as differing 
ability to contribute or power of contribution.  Note that there are both quantitative and 
qualitative components of strength.  
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Applying such considerations to issues of crisis, a “crisis event” can be seen as a 
situation when projections by parties based on their expectations are not realized in 
practice (ie, with the passing of time or influential events).  The panel in Fig 3 
illustrates an hypothetical credit crisis where expected credit C1 = 37 is reduced in an 
F “meltdown” to C2 =23 followed by an increased projection by G to rebuild credit C3 
=36.8, ie to near C1.  Government “projects 80% more” to offset the “75% lesser 
projection” by finance and the associated 38% drop in Credit available.11 This 
illustrates the Keynesian liquidity trap and the governmental response which is ideally 
short term until the projection f of Finance F recovers.  That is, credit on issue is 
maintained by changing the contributions of the elemental parties in offsetting ways. 
 
C   37  23    36.8 
Stages:  Pre-crisis  f shrinks nonuniformly  g grows 80% 
Fig. 3. Initial situation, crisis and response: an illustration of “Credit” differently composed 
The schema can also be applied to intelligence if the vectors reflected “assessed 
intelligence”.12  Each of three parties (or three parts of one party) is set against the 
three dimensions of some definitional basis, such as those earlier mentioned.  For 
some reason the scalar value of f is assessed “downwards”, perhaps as a result of 
some noted unintelligence and/or “meltdown”.  Within-group compensation is 
through a greater reliance on g to maintain the value of the collective product, a 
reliance that could lead to further crises (Figure 1).   
It is an open question whether the collective credit or intelligence C is sustainable 
or apposite to the situation faced, or whether a fresh start should be made.  So far, a 
“same-as-was-usual” ploy has been the favoured response for both the collective 
credit and unintelligence problems of the global financial crisis.  However, history 
indicates a marked and lasting reduction in credits and debits along with insolvencies 
at some stage in any true recovery, a repositioning of ideas and attitudes and new 
judgments of  “creditworthiness “ and “intelligence”.   
                                                          
11 Monetary parties M are assumed to remain unchanged for ease of exposition.  Note also that   
government G is assumed to act directly without involving finance F.  To the extent that G 
borrows via F, g as projected (but not as obligated) will be reduced and f increased 
12 presuming some suitable basis, means of measurement and units of measure. 
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5 Conclusion 
The approach of Hegel is commonly cast in terms such as “Thesis, Antithesis and 
Synthesis”.  Some identified “thing”13  is associated with a different one resulting in 
some new thing.  Often the preference is to choose “the competing opposite” as the 
antithesis but the method is wider.  One or more “complementary differents” may be 
used as in the vector example.  The process whereby synthesis is achieved is 
aufheben,14 a term little used or, arguably, understood in English. 
Two examples illustrate something of the many usages, and some of the potential 
problems if “unintelligence” were to be used simply as a competitive antithesis: 
─  The arguments of Marx and others cast a thesis (Labour, a projection of direct 
human effort) and antithesis (Kapital, an alternate projection) in competitive 
opposition, despite their mutual interdependence in production, consumption 
and societies.  The posited struggle between them has coloured much history, 
and for the revolutionary aufheben became a process of achieving dominance 
given competing interests or theses.  
─  Bernanke demonstrates an allegiance to a thesis of rationality (preferencing a 
particular projection of analytical thinking) and a discounting of “irrationality” 
(including of such things as opportunism).  He and other current (but not some 
past) central bankers profess an ongoing commitment to monetary rules to 
change behavior, “intelligent” behavior in the sense of Pfeifer and Scheier.  
Whether such commitments are sufficient to the tasks at hand or a source of 
collective unintelligence is a point of current debate. 
Whatever the merits of chosen ideas, practical implementations can demonstrate 
much collective unintelligence.  Interpretation of influences as competing opposites is 
but one interpretation, one of arguments in an idiomatically two-vector scalar product 
tradition.  Using triple products could enrich our dialogues and representations.    
─ Production could become the product of land, labour and capital variously 
combined “co-operatively” to yield scalar and vector product outcomes. 
─ Central bankers might consider various outcomes of rationality, opportunism 
and unintelligence (be this in institutional, consumer or institutional stances).   
─ Using FIGM and like projections, an improved representation of “Credit” or 
perhaps “Intelligence” and their various interplays may be developed. 
─ The combinations of Hegel‟s elements can be cast in a new light.  
Triple products can provide rich second stage representations.  Whether these are 
meaningful and usable is the related first stage issue.  Both warrant attention. 
                                                          
13 such as an entity, attribute, position or projection, for example. 
14 Aufheben is a rich word with a range of interpretations.  Briefly, it contains the idea of 
building up while breaking down (as in Schumpter‟s “creative destruction”), the idea of 
maintaining some things while changing others (as evident in the “diversity-compliance 
tradeoff” casting of intelligence by Pfeifer and Scheier), and the idea of opposition and 
differences to be resolved.  The concept deserves renewed attention.     
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Efforts to understand collective intelligence are important as are those to avoid or 
mitigate crises.  It is hoped that ideas in this paper illustrate how areas might be 
advanced not only technically but in ways meaningful to our lives and societies.  
Clearly much remains to be done.  Cooperation and mutual regard in dialogues and 
developments are needed if the area of collective intelligence is to become potent and 
enabling.  Collective unintelligence and alternative models of association indicate 
ways to better appreciate crises in economics and how humans with their artefacts 
“intelligently” position and project themselves to achieve and advance, or otherwise.   
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